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Introduction
According to traditional Just War Theory’s jus ad bellum, a warring 
agent must have the right intention, that is, the intention to achieve the 
just cause by way of a military campaign and that campaign must have a 
significant chance of succeeding. Contemporary just war scholars focus 
increasingly on the importance of jus post bellum—justice after war—for 
the legitimacy of military campaigns. Some authors argue that violent 
agents must have strategies for establishing a peaceful and just rule after 
military operations cease.1
Most recent wars (including military interventions, for example, in 
Libya 2012) have failed both in their (narrow) political goal of  stopping 
human rights violations, but also in their (wide) political goal of paci-
fying the respective regions and promoting transitions towards more 
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legitimate regimes. And terrorism’s ‘success record’ seems even worse: 
when has terrorism ever secured a just political cause and led to a lasting 
peace? Conflicts like that between Israel and Palestine seem to suggest 
that terrorism perpetuates violence and nothing but worsens political 
conflicts. With a growing number of random suicide attacks in Europe 
at the moment, it is tempting to conclude that all that terrorists ever 
(aim to) achieve is destruction and despair.
The most common moral argument against terrorism is that it 
directly and deliberately targets innocents or non-combatants. One may 
or may not agree with this argument.2 However, quite independently, it 
would seem to undermine the legitimacy of terrorist campaigns if they 
were unlikely to secure their (potentially just) cause or to achieve a last-
ing peace, that is, if their violent campaign would perpetuate violence 
rather than bring it to an end. Is there something about terrorist vio-
lence that makes it more difficult to meet these two criteria?
Let us call ‘prospect of success’ the narrow success criterion and 
‘(achieving) a lasting peace’ the wide success criterion. A violent group 
has a solid ‘prospect of success’ if it has a good chance to secure its just 
cause. That is, if recurring human rights violations provide a group with 
a just cause for starting a violent campaign then the just cause is secured 
if the group’s activities bring these rights violations to an end. It is much 
harder to say what exactly should be meant by a ‘lasting peace’ and I 
will discuss this criterion in more detail later. For now, let us simply say 
that it requires an agent to take positive actions towards political stabil-
ity, non-violence and minimal justice within the community in which 
they operate after the violent campaign ends.
Assuming that terrorist actors can, in principle, fight for a just cause 
(and have in the past fought for just causes) and that they can, in prin-
ciple, strive for a just and peaceful society, can their campaigns ever 
meet these criteria?
In other words, does the use of terrorism as such—state or 
non-state—jeopardize a lasting peace in a way that other violent, for 
instance, military, strategies do not? Terrorist actors would seem to 
have greater difficulty than military actors in satisfying the relevant 
conditions of jus ad bellum (narrow success criterion) and jus post 
 bellum (wide success criterion) and, consequently, terrorist campaigns 
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would seem more difficult to justify. In the following, I will address 
both issues  in turn. In doing so, I will leave another important—and 
in many scholars’ view the most important—moral challenge to ter-
rorist violence  aside: the problem of violence against innocents, non-
combatants, or civilians.3 This problem has been discussed at length 
elsewhere4 and  at least some authors have argued that even direct 
attacks against members of that group may be permissible under certain 
circumstances.5
This chapter tries to answer the following questions:
1. Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or 
just causes: Is it more difficult for terrorists to achieve their political 
goals? In other words, is it more difficult for terrorist actors to satisfy 
the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory, our narrow success 
criterion?
2. Second, is it more difficult for terrorist campaigns to lead to a lasting 
peace, that is, to satisfy the wide success criterion, because of
 a. the method used (in other words, is the terrorist method worse 
than other violent methods in that it makes certain jus post bellum 
requirements harder to achieve)? or
b. the agents employing this method (in other words, is it harder 
for non-state agents to deliver on jus post bellum)? Let me nar-
row down this question: In my view, both state and non-state 
agents can employ terrorism. The interesting question is whether 
or not non-state violent agents have greater difficulty in ensuring 
that their violent campaign leads to a lasting peace than military 
agents?
Before turning to our main discussion, let me briefly point to another 
interesting question that may arise in this context but cannot be 
addressed here. Some scholars, such as Uwe Steinhoff, have argued that 
violent resistance against oppression need not meet the success criterion 
in certain cases:
If the American cavalry in the Indian wars has surrounded a tribe and 
now wants to slaughter men, women and children, must these refrain 
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from defence only because it is hopeless, that is, because it would by no 
means save them?6
Steinhoff thinks that those confronting genocidal violence need not 
refrain from defending themselves when their defense is futile. Rather, 
Steinhoff argues, self-defense is legitimate even when it is not likely to 
succeed. It should be pointed out, however, that the case described by 
Steinhoff is rather different from the kind of cases we are concerned 
with. Individual self-defense has different moral implications than 
defensive war. As Christopher Finlay observes, greater standards of 
care should apply to non-state violent campaigns than to self-defense, 
because the former often causes the death of innocents.7 In the follow-
ing, I will simply assume that we should have a safeguard against using 
political violence for lost albeit just causes.
Terrorism and Prospect of Success
My starting assumption is that at least some violent actors who have 
employed terrorism have done so to pursue legitimate goals or just 
causes. This section discusses whether there is something about terror-
ism that makes it harder for its agents to meet the success criterion. Is 
it more difficult for terrorist campaigns to satisfy the narrow success cri-
terion than it is for military campaigns, for instance? Some might even 
ask whether any terrorist violence has ever succeeded in achieving its 
political goals. I think this question must be answered affirmatively. I 
will give several historical examples in the sections that follow.
But before we the success criterion, we must clarify what exactly is 
meant by “terrorist campaign” or “terrorist violence.” It is a good start-
ing point to contrast terrorist violence with military violence:
According to Brian Orend,
[w]ar should be understood as an actual, intentional and widespread 
armed conflict between political communities…. it seems that all warfare 
is precisely, and ultimately about governance. War is a violent way for deter-
mining who gets to say what goes on in a given territory.8
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I have discussed the distinction between war and terrorism at length 
elsewhere.9 For the purpose of this chapter, let us understand warfare 
to be “a physical, military method of forcing an enemy” while “[t]
errorism aims at people’s beliefs, perceptions and actions and is, thus, 
a fundamentally psychological strategy.”10 Understanding both as dis-
tinct ways of employing violence for political ends or, in other words, 
as different violent political strategies, means that terrorism can form 
part of a war.
In Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry I argued that terrorism is an 
indirect strategy for achieving one’s goals, where violence (or the cred-
ible threat thereof ) is used against one target group (direct targets) to 
influence another target group (indirect targets) by way of the fear or 
terror induced by the violent attacks against the direct targets. “Terrorist 
acts are the violent acts that form part of such a strategy.”11 A terrorist 
campaign is a set of terrorist acts sustained over a specific period of time 
by a specific (group) agent with a specific goal. This can be a standalone 
goal or part of a larger campaign. A violent campaign can pursue its 
goals using different strategies—terrorist, guerrilla or military.12
My question is whether there is any principled reason that terrorist 
campaigns would have more difficulty satisfying the narrow success cri-
terion, that is, whether it is more difficult for actors employing terror-
ist methods to achieve their political goals than for those using military 
violence. 
Prospect of success is a requirement meant to prevent the use of vio-
lence (and the moral harms related to it) for defending lost causes. Its 
rationale is simple and compelling at first glance: if there is no chance of 
winning a war then it should not be waged. Why? Because it is wrong 
to waste human lives and resources for no benefit.13 What level of prob-
ability is required? According to Suzanne Uniacke,
“Reasonable prospect of success” is not a precise standard and … is 
intended to allow prudent judgment about how low an expectation is too 
low… [A] political authority can be justified in resorting to war only if it 
believes on reasonable grounds that success is significantly more than an 
outside chance.14
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As mentioned, the prospect of success requirement has been challenged 
as counterintuitive in some cases. Since I believe the challenge to be 
unfounded, I will therefore leave this problem aside here.15 Another 
challenge is to do with conceptual parsimony. According to this chal-
lenge, prospect of success is a sub-criterion of ad-bellum proportionality, 
not an independent consideration.16 This is because if ad-bellum pro-
portionality is met, then prospect of success is met—the satisfaction of 
the former entails the satisfaction of the latter. However, we need not 
worry about this challenge here because it only concerns the relation-
ship between different criteria of Just War Theory as such.17 If the suc-
cess criterion is indeed a sub-criterion of proportionality, then failure to 
meet it will entail a failure of ad-bellum proportionality. Satisfying the 
former criterion is a necessary condition for satisfying the latter.
Let us now return to our question of whether or not terrorist vio-
lence is less likely to meet the narrow success criterion than military 
violence is. Importantly, the empirical question of whether terrorism 
has ever achieved (one of ) its political goals is to be separated from 
the principled question of whether it is more difficult for terrorism to 
achieve its goals.
As to the empirical question, both state and non-state terrorist cam-
paigns have in the past been successful. State terrorism can mean (1) 
the employment of terrorist methods or the support of terrorist groups 
occasionally and for certain purposes, as was the case with the Operación 
Condor in South America, the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación in 
Spain or the US support of the Contras in Nicaragua, and (2) the use of 
terror to sustain an oppressive political regime such as Nazi Germany or 
the Soviet Union during the Stalin era.18 I will leave aside the second 
type of state terrorism here, because terror regimes are quite different 
from kind of terrorist violence I am concerned with.19
However, state terrorism of both types has often been successful and 
so has non-state terrorism: Some would argue that the Zionist organi-
zation Irgun was successful in undermining British rule in Palestine in 
the 1940s and therewith contributed to the creation of a Jewish state.20 
The West-German Red Army Faction (RAF) violence had a catalyzing 
effect on West-German society and democracy, shaking up the rigid 
political establishment and forcing an overdue critical discourse onto a 
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society, which had turned away from its Nazi past without sufficiently 
confronting the crimes committed. The 2003 Madrid bombings argu-
ably lead to a regime change in Spain and the subsequent withdrawal of 
Spanish troupes from Iraq. Palestinian terrorism against Israel has been 
successful at least with its short-term political goals of drawing attention to 
the Palestinians’ plight and shifting the discourse from the  humanitarian 
aspect of the problem to that of liberation and self-determination.21
What about the principled question concerning terrorists’ prospect 
of success? The terrorist method consists in exploiting fear in order to 
achieve (political) goals. Terrorism requires an audience to shock, intim-
idate and coerce, and it functions indirectly by influencing attitudes, 
beliefs and behaviour.22 It is a way of communicating a—more or less 
clear—message to its indirect targets, but also to potential sympathizers. 
As Christopher Finlay argues: “An attack might impress or inspire the 
constituency in the name of which the terrorists claim to act.”23
Insofar as terrorism is used to violently communicate a particular 
political message, it is in principle very likely to succeed merely because 
of the relative modesty of its goal and the attention-generating nature 
of terrorist acts. In other words, terrorist violence is an effective way of 
attracting attention for a political cause. In the past, terrorist strategies 
have been employed towards a variety of ends, including demoralizing 
governments and their supporters, challenging a government’s effec-
tiveness and demonstrating its vulnerability, often by “undermining its 
claim to be able to maintain basic levels of security for those it claims 
to protect.”24 Sometimes they have involved more concrete goals such 
as demanding the release of prisoners, the withdrawal of troupes or—
in the long term—political independence of a nation or a community. 
However, insofar as terrorist campaigns aim at tangible political change, 
as an indirect method terrorism may well be less likely to succeed than 
direct (military) campaigns. More complex and long-term goals such 
as self-determination for peoples like the Palestinians or the Basques 
seem to be significantly less likely to be achieved by the use of terrorism 
alone.25 This means that they are not justified in resorting to terrorism, 
despite arguably having (had) a just cause.
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Terrorism and jus post bellum
Let me now turn to the wide success criterion. Larry May, one of 
the  protagonists of recent debates surrounding justice after war, 
argues that jus ad bellum and jus post bellum are not entirely inde-
pendent:
certain jus post bellum considerations, such as the duty to rebuild, can 
affect the jus ad bellum, at least understood broadly to include likelihood 
of success. If there is a duty to rebuild on part of the victor, then war 
should normally not be initiated unless State A has the means and will to 
rebuild the vanquished State B’s infrastructure that will be damaged by 
State A’s military actions.26, 27
In other words, an agent is not justified in resorting to war unless they 
are likely to be able to deliver justice after the war, that is, after violent 
hostilities are over. May argues that “[t]he proper moral answer to the 
question ‘why do we fight’ must be ‘to achieve peace’.”28 and that “[i]f 
the object of war is a just and lasting peace [the only legitimate cause for 
war, according to May, A.S.], then all of Just War considerations should 
be aimed at this goal.”29
If applied to terrorist violence, this would mean that a terrorist actor 
could never be fully justified in resorting to terrorism unless they are 
able to satisfy (at least some of the) jus post bellum criteria. The claim 
that jus ad bellum and jus post bellum are linked in this way is worthy of 
discussion, but cannot be debated here.30 But quite independently, we 
can discuss the question of whether or not terrorist actors have greater 
difficulty than other violent actors to satisfy jus post bellum requirements 
as such.
According to May, it is important to distinguish the justice of ending 
war (jus ad terminationem belli) from the justice after war (jus post bellum). 
The former is more concerned with regulating the end of violent hostili-
ties while the latter focuses on (re)establishing lasting peace. May iden-
tifies six jus post bellum requirements, which aim at creating a just and 
lasting peace:
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(1) rebuilding; (2) retribution; (3) restitution; (4) reparation; (5) recon-
ciliation; (6) proportionality31
He adds, “for a just peace to ensue, these principles must all be met, at 
least to a certain extent.”32 It is important to note that May does not 
think that these requirements apply to one of the conflicting parties 
alone. Both previously warring parties must work together to achieve 
peace. The victor has some duties regardless of whether or not he was 
the aggressor or defender33 and even a “defending vanquished state may 
have duties of restitution and repair.” Both just and unjust actors must 
work towards reconciliation.34
Assuming that at least in some cases terrorist violence is employed 
with the aim of establishing a just and lasting peace, is this goal more 
difficult to achieve for terrorist actors? How can the six jus post bellum 
criteria be relevant to terrorist campaigns? Let us consider the possi bi-
lity of a successful campaign with a clear political goal—such as grant-
ing independence and self-determination a particular people or nation 
(we could imagine that Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) campaign in the 
Basque Country had been successful).
It is not clear that all criteria of justice after war should equally apply 
to justice after a terrorist campaign. First and foremost, the line between 
“war” and “peace” is seldom a clear one when it comes to terrorist cam-
paigns. In fact, terrorist violence regularly exploits precisely this lack of 
delineation, conducting acts of violence in times of peace when they 
are least expected and most disturbing. However, terrorist organiza-
tions have in the past formally declared their violent campaigns to be 
ended—e.g., ETA did this in 2011. Second, the amount of destruction 
and the sheer quantity of violence are significantly lower for most ter-
rorist campaigns compared to military ones, rendering the problems of 
rebuilding and reparation less relevant. Let us therefore focus on the one 
aspect that will be relevant to achieving a just and lasting peace in the 
aftermath of most—if not all—terrorist campaigns: reconciliation will be 
crucial for any peace process.
May puts forward the following principles of reconciliation, roughly:
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• an obligation to treat people with equal basic respect regardless of 
which side they were on; and
• “an obligation to initiate and conduct war in such a way that one 
does not unduly antagonize the people with whom one will eventu-
ally have to reach a peaceful accord.”35
I am particularly interested in the second principle of reconciliation 
here. This principle points back to jus ad bellum and in bello and sug-
gests that what it means to have in mind a lasting peace is to make an 
effort from the outset to not antagonize people unduly.36 Of course, a 
lot depends on what is meant by “unduly” here and May admits that 
this needs further specification and cannot be determined outside a par-
ticular context.37
Is reconciliation more difficult to achieve for terrorist actors due to 
the methods they employ? The first thing to note is that terrorism is 
usually defined as violence against non-combatants, innocents or civil-
ians. While I have argued against this so-called narrow  definition, 
defending instead a wide definition of terrorism, which includes 
acts perpetrated against non-innocents,38 it remains true that much 
 terrorism does directly target those who have not forfeited their right 
not to be attacked. This in itself would make it very difficult for  terrorist 
actors to adhere to the second principle of reconciliation introduced 
earlier: terrorists seem to conduct their violent struggle in a way that 
usually does antagonize those with whom they are aiming to reach an 
accord. In the context of terrorism in support of self-determination, 
these would be the people both in the country from which the ter-
rorists wish to secede as well as those within their own territory and 
 community who do not necessarily support the terrorist aims but with 
whom the violent actors will have to live.
Reconciliation, then, is probably more attainable to terrorist agents 
who do not use violence against innocents or civilians. This is the case 
if violence is only directed at non-innocents or against infrastructure 
and property, without physically harming humans at all. Some may 
argue that this would no longer constitute terrorism. I think that ter-
rorism as a strategy as described previously can well be employed with 
so-called non-innocents as the primary or direct targets of violent 
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acts. One example for this kind of terrorism is the Argentinean group 
Montoneros, who in the 1970s targeted above all members of the gov-
ernment and administration as well as people who represented foreign 
commercial interests in the country.39 The South African Umkhonto We 
Sizwe (MK) seem to have generally adhered to the principle of discrimi-
nation and were mostly engaged in acts of sabotage. In 1980, together 
with the ANC, MK even signed a declaration to conform to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 1 of 1977. The Basque ETA usually 
issued warnings ahead of bomb attacks with a view to minimizing harm 
to human lives. Furthermore, according to Peter Townshend
Its use of indiscriminate attacks remained sparing (though, as in the 
bombing of Madrid airport and railway stations in July 1979, still very 
shocking). Overall, its targeting was focused primarily on the Guardia 
Civil and the police. It showed a marked preference for the use of com-
paratively accurate weapons – small arms rather than explosives – and a 
determination repeatedly to attack high-ranking officials and officers, the 
highest being Admiral Carrero Blanco in 1973, and others, including the 
military governors of Madrid and Guipúzcoa in 1979.40
Terrorism, understood as a method involving selective high-impact 
attacks, is by its very nature more discriminating than military opera-
tions. Gaining territorial and political control over one’s enemy will 
subjects military actors to much greater strategic necessities.
Because war aims at controlling a territory, its agents can often not 
be too discerning about individual manoeuvres. The terrorist agent 
need not worry about the demands of military and strategic necessity 
and is certainly more flexible when it comes to operational and tactical 
matters. She can be highly selective of her targets. In fact, because she 
chooses her targets so carefully as to maximize her actions’ visibility, she 
is by necessity discriminating (which is different from saying that she 
adheres to the principle of discrimination). This commonly means that 
terrorist actors choose to target innocents, but it need not mean that.
Finally, terrorist agents regularly engage in some kind of public dis-
course over their aims and seek to explain their actions to the general 
public, usually with the aim of eliciting attention for what they perceive 
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to be a morally just struggle or sometimes even to generate sympa-
thy. Terrorists often seek to convince rather than to conquer. In fact, 
I  believe that engagement in public discourse of this kind is crucial 
to the overall legitimacy of terrorist and other non-state violence. In 
Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry, I argued that
Before resorting to violence, an agent X must make her objectives known 
to the general public and must provide a justification for the employment 
of violence. She must expose herself to a critical debate of those goals and 
their justifying principles. This condition averts the abuse of violence by 
misled and ignorant persons. It furthermore ensures that the violent cam-
paign is endorsed by those on whose behalf it is being led. It forces the 
terrorist actor to relate to the moral and political mindset of the society 
in which she lives and which she will impact with her violent campaign. 
The discourse-condition keeps socially and morally detached individu-
als from employing terrorist violence, those who, owing to their aliena-
tion from their surroundings, misjudge the necessity to induce political 
change  violently.41
In sum, there is no principled reason why terrorist violence would 
threaten reconciliation more than other forms of political violence. That 
is, unless one believes that terrorism involves—by definition—the direct 
targeting of innocents. Possibly, there are few things that will antagonize 
people more than attacks on those who rightfully believe themselves to be 
immune from violence. It should be noted, however, that contemporary 
military campaigns take a much higher toll on human life than terrorism, 
including innocent lives. Some might say that military violence at least 
does not directly target innocents, but rather incidentally (and sometimes 
accidentally) causes innocent fatalities. Even if there is a moral differ-
ence between intentional attacks on innocents and incidental attacks (see 
Schwenkenbecher 2014), it seems fair to say that contemporary warring 
agents would struggle greatly to satisfy May’s reconciliation criterion.
Is it more difficult for terrorist campaigns to achieve reconciliation 
due to the kind of agents employing terrorism? In particular, do non-
state violent agents have greater difficulty in realizing that goal, which, 
according to May, is instrumental to a lasting peace?
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It may sound surprising, but I believe that terrorist actors might be 
better placed than military actors to deliver on jus in bello discrimi-
nation (therewith providing the basis for reconciliation) for several 
reasons. First, members of terrorist groups tend to be unified by a com-
mon (usually ideological) aim much more than members of a military 
organization. Intrinsically motivated agents would seem better suited to 
enact the group’s decisions in a way that is true to its goals. In other 
words, they are less likely to go “off the rail” and act against the group’s 
adopted aims. If the group has adopted a strategy of discrimination, 
its members would usually be intrinsically motivated to adhere to that 
strategy.
Second, terrorist groups usually operate under better epistemic and 
psychological conditions than military agents. Operating in hiding, with 
all its uncertainties, would allow for better decision-making than the 
midst of a battlefield. War’s complexities generate epistemically and psy-
chologically challenging conditions and decisions must often be made 
under great pressure. While the terrorist is in fear of being arrested, 
those partaking in war will fear to lose their lives. By avoiding the bat-
tlefield, terrorists eliminate the impact that fearing for one’s life tends to 
have on one’s decision-making (and those terrorist actors who pay for an 
attack with their life have often made a conscious decision to do so).
In sum, terrorist campaigns are not in principle less likely to secure (or 
contribute to) lasting peace than military campaigns, in particular if their 
violent attacks are discriminate and accompanied by an engagement in 
public discourse. To the extent that the level of destruction they bring 
about is significantly lower for terrorism than it is for war or military 
intervention, they may even be better suited to fostering lasting peace.
Conclusion
In this final section, I will make a few comments regarding the prospect 
of peace as such. May subscribes to a contingent pacifism and holds the 
view that most wars should not be waged. Richard O’Meara, in con-
trast, argues that “peace is not a condition, but an ongoing process” and 
that “lasting peace is often an elusive goal.”42 Is it too much to ask of a 
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violent actor that she achieve that goal? Jus post bellum would indeed 
appear to be overly demanding if it required that violent agents only 
wage war if they can guarantee something that many political communi-
ties cannot guarantee their citizens. If non-state violent agents (terrorist 
or not) can significantly improve the political conditions in a given com-
munity, while falling short of establishing a lasting peace, this should 
arguably suffice. If peace is indeed a process, their campaigns could in 
principe – as odd as this may sound – contribute to that process.
Moreover, the duty to establish a peaceful and just regime in the 
aftermath of a violent conflict does not pertain to the violent actor(s) 
alone, as May argued. For terrorist campaigns this means that after the 
violence ceases, be it because the terrorists gain political power (as in the 
ANC’s case) or because they achieve their political goal (while remain-
ing clandestine) or because they give up (as in ETA’s case), all conflict 
parties, not only the victors, must contribute to reconciliation, restitu-
tion and rehabilitation.43, 44
In conclusion, there appears to be little reason to believe that terrorist 
campaigns are in principle less able to secure or at least contribute to a 
lasting peace than military campaigns; quite to the contrary. Or, put dif-
ferently, if terrorism is an unlikely method for securing peace, then war 
is an even more unlikely one.
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 8. Orend (2008).
 9. Schwenkenbecher (2012, 41ff ).
 10. Ibid., 41.
 11. Ibid., 38.
 12. For comprehensive discussions on the definition of terrorism, see for 
instance Nathanson (2010), chapters 1 and 2; Messelken (2005).
 13. See e.g. Orend (2006, 58f ).
 14. Uniacke (2010, 70).
 15. For my response to Steinhoff see Schwenkenbecher (2012, 97). See also 
Hurka (2005).
 16. See for instance Finlay (2015, 131), Schwenkenbecher (2012, 98), 
Hurka (2005), Steinhoff (2007).
 17. In my view, the narrow success criterion does not involve any assess-
ment of the moral acceptability of the goals. It is, in this sense, a purely 
“technical,” that is, morally neutral, criterion. However, I will not 
argue for that here. The wide success criterion, in contrast, is morally 
charged, as it presupposes a certain kind of—morally worthwhile—
goal. See also the discussion in Toner (2010).
 18. For a detailed discussion of state and non-state terrorism, see 
Schwenkenbecher (2012, 21ff ). See also Primoratz (2004).
 19. Schwenkenbecher (2012, 29f ).
 20. For a more detailed discussion of Irgun, see Shughart (2006), Hoffman 
(2006), Townshend (2002).
 21. For an excellent discussion of this conflict, see Primoratz (2013, 148ff ). 
I agree with Primoratz’ assessment that Palestinian terrorism has failed 
to achieve its long-term political goals.
 22. Schwenkenbecher (2012, 38ff ).
 23. Finlay (2015, 251).
 24. Ibid., 251.
 25. Sadly, terrorist campaigns tend to be enormously successful at securing 
“negative” aims such as destabilizing a political system, undermining 
public order and safety, and curtailing basic liberties. However, I would 
regard these as short-to-mid-term goals, usually meant to promote 
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some long-term goal that signifies a positive political outcome for the 
group (independence, ending occupation and interference, triggering 
an uprising against the existing political order).
 26. May (2012, 15–16).
 27. Similarly, Todd A. Burkhardt argues for “incorporating jus post bel-
lum obligations into a state’s reasonable chance of success calculation” 
(2013, 120).
 28. May (2012, 12).
 29. Ibid., 13.
 30. This question has been debated for instance in May (2012), Bass 
(2004), and Pollard (2013). A rejection of the ‘dependence thesis’, that 
is, the thesis that the jus ad bellum depends on jus post bellum can be 
found in Pattison (2015).
 31. May (2012, 19–21).
 32. Ibid., 22.
 33. Ibid., 17.
 34. Ibid.
 35. Ibid., 96.
 36. This points back to the discussion of the relationship between the dif-
ferent sets of Just War criteria. Similar to May, Toner (2010, 96) argues 
for the interdependence of jus in bello with ad bellum, arguing that in 
bello ‘right intention’ mirrors the ad bellum right intention criterion 
(that the war be led with the end of a just peace in mind).
 37. May (2012, 96).
 38. Schwenkenbecher (2012, 30ff ).
 39. Shughart (2006).
 40. Townshend (2002, 84).
 41. Schwenkenbecher (2012, 104–105).
 42. O’Meara (2013, 107).
 43. May (2012).
 44. Some authors even argue that jus post bellum ought to be taken care 
of by the international community if need be, on the basis of prin-
ciples of global justice. James Pattison defends in particular the duty 
to rebuild institutions is “an international, collective duty to promote 
and establish just political institutions” (2015, 12) in the aftermath 
of war. According to Pattison, “there should be a presumption against 
belligerents rebuilding. … [O]ther agents may be in a better posi-
tion to rebuild. This seems to be particularly the case for post-war 
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occupation, when the warring parties’ involvement in the conflict can 
lead to significant antagonism among the local population and there-
fore mean that effective rebuilding may be difficult … Instead, it seems 
that the rebuilding process should not only be authorized by the UN 
Security Council, but also generally be carried out by it (for example, 
by UN peacekeepers or a UN transitional administration).” (2015, 24) 
However, this point seems less relevant for terrorist violence.
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